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NO MORE RELIGIOUS PROTECTION:
THE IMPACT OF LYNG V NORTHWEST
INDIAN CEMETERY PROTECTION ASS'N
I. INTRODUCTION
The free exercise clause of the first amendment protects the right to
practice religion.1 Courts2 and legislatures3 recognize that the right to
believe in4 and to worship freely' a Supreme Being constitutes a funda-
mental right.6 Consequently, an individual has the right to invoke con-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof... ." Id.
The free exercise clause applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
2. See, eg., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)
(the right to freely worship is a fundamental right).
3. See, e.g., The American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 (AIRFA), 42
U.S.C. § 1996 (1982). AIRFA protects and preserves "for American Indians their in-
herent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the
American Indians... including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of
sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites."
Id.
4. The freedom to believe is absolute. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303. The Supreme
Court originally held that the free exercise clause generally protected one's right to have
religious beliefs. This right, however, does have limits. See, eg., Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (permitting a man who engaged in polygamy to exer-
cise his beliefs "would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to
the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself").
5. The Supreme Court eventually extended free exercise protection to individual
acts as well as beliefs in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The Court stated
that the first amendment "embraces two concepts, freedom to believe and freedom to
act." Id. at 303. The freedom to act, however, is not absolute but "remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society." Iad at 304.
6. Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards under the Free Exercise
Clause, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1217, 1217-18.
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stitutional protection when government policy or action restrains his or
her ability to worship.7 Native Americans consider this right of para-
mount importance when trying to protect their sacred lands.8 Native
American religion revolves around sacred land. Thus, the destruction
or alteration of this land destroys the core of Native American religion
and other important aspects of Native American life.9
Before allowing any burden on an individual's free exercise of reli-
gion, courts historically require that the government show its action
constitutes the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling
state objective.1l In deciding Native American sacred land cases, how-
7. See, eg., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 402
U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See infra notes 17-51 and
accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
8. Some of the more noteworthy sacred land cases include: Wilson v. Block, 708
F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1984) (holding that alternative
religious sites alleviate the burden on Native American religions); Sequoyah v. Tennes-
see Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980) (holding
that the governmental action did not burden a central aspect of Native American reli-
gion); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954
(1981) (holding that an important government interest outweighs any burden on the
Native American's religion). Cases at the district court level include: Crow v. Gullet,
541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982) (court held that state should not prohibit religious acts
nor should it provide the means to carry them out); Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope
v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska 1982) (holding that the Native Americans
failed to show a burden on their religion).
9. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 459-60
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Ior most Native Americans, '[t]he area of worship cannot be delineated from
social, political, cultural, and other areas of Indian lifestyle.' A pervasive feature of
this lifestyle is the individual's relationship with the natural world .... While
traditional western religions view creation as the work of a deity 'who institutes
natural laws which then govern the operation of physical nature,' tribal religions
regard creation as an on-going process in which they are morally and religiously
obligated to participate. Native Americans fulfill this duty through ceremonies and
rituals designed to preserve and stabilize the earth and to protect humankind from
disease and other catastrophes. Failure to conduct these ceremonies in the manner
and place specified, adherents believe, will result in great harm to the earth and to
the people whose welfare depends upon it.
Id (citations omitted). See also A. HULTKRANTZ, BELIEF AND WORSHIP IN NATIVE
NORTH AMERICA (1981) (emphasizing that the core of Indian religions is their land).
10. See, e.g. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972) (allowing Amish children
to be educated at home infringed less upon their first amendment rights than requiring
school attendance until age 16). See infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Yoder. See also Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975) (a prison's
interests could be served without requiring an Native American to cut his hair against
his religious beliefs).
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ever, district and appellate courts have failed to use traditional free
exercise analysis and have been inconsistent both in their formulation
and application of free exercise analysis.1" In Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 12 the Supreme Court decided whether a
state government's infringement on tribal sacred land violated the Con-
stitution.13 The Court upheld this infringement because the govern-
ment did not coerce Native Americans into practicing a different
religion or penalize their beliefs.14 This coercion or penalty require-
ment, though, may significantly reduce the possibility of bringing a
successful suit against the government.15
II. TRADITIONAL FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE ANALYSIS
The first amendment's free exercise clause theoretically applies
equally to the religious practices and beliefs of all citizens. 16 In a re-
cent opinion, the Supreme Court stated that first amendment protec-
tion exists even if a religious belief is unacceptable, ilogical,
inconsistent, or incomprehensible to others.17 Historically, however,
many religious minorities and groups with unusual views have failed in
their pursuit of free exercise claims.
18
11. See infra notes 54-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of Sequoyah v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1984); Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah
1977), aff'd, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
12. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
13. See infra notes 90-111 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lyng.
14. 485 U.S. at 449.
15. See 485 U.S. at 476, where Brennan suggests that the Lyng decision strips the
Indian's religious practices of constitutional protection. Id (Brennan, J., dissenting).
16. But cf Kurland, Expanding Concepts of Religious Freedom, Foreward-Church
and State in the United States: A New Era of Bad Feelings, 1966 Wis. L. Rav. 215, 216
(stating that although courts have generally been tolerant toward religious minorities,
"the caveat must be added that the minority must not be too small or eccentric.").
17. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). The Thomas Court distin-
guished between religious and philosophical beliefs, noting that religious beliefs are af-
forded first amendment protection. Id at 713. The Court reversed the Indiana
Supreme Court's characterization of Thomas' beliefs as a personal philosophical choice
not entitled to first amendment protection. Id at 714-15.
18. United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968) (district court rejected
defendant's claim that she was a minister of the Neo-American Church and that mari-
juana and LSD were true sacramental foods and their use was essential to her religion).
See, ag., Reynolds v. United States, 99 U.S. 145 (1878) (Mormons suffered harsh
sentences for practicing polygamy); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (Mormons
1990]
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Given the broad spectrum of conflicting religious beliefs and prac-
tices in the United States, it is easy to understand why the Court has
struggled in formulating a free exercise analysis that protects all citi-
zens. Traditionally, a plaintiff could establish a prima facie case under
the first amendment by showing that a governmental action or policy
burdened a sincerely held religious belief. 9 If the plaintiff succeeded in
establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the government to
show that its action or policy was the least restrictive means of accom-
plishing a compelling state objective.20
The development of free exercise analysis changed direction with the
1963 Supreme Court decision in Sherbert v. Verner.2 In Sherbert, the
Supreme Court upheld a free exercise claim in favor of an individual
for the first time.22 Adell Sherbert was a member of the Seventh-Day
Adventist Church, which prohibits Saturday labor.23 Sherbert's em-
practicing polygamy lost the right to vote); Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
293 U.S. 245 (1934) (conscientious objectors could not attend state-run universities);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (Jehovah's Witnesses can be prohibited
from having their children sell or distribute religious literature in public); In re Fergu-
son, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 674, 361 P.2d 417, 423, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753, 759, cert. denied, 368
U.S. 864 (1961) (stating that "the Muslim Religious Group is not entitled as of right to
be allowed to practice their religious beliefs in prison. .. ");.
19. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963), holding that the first
question is whether the government action imposes any burden on the challenger's reli-
gion. Courts hold that beliefs are burdened if governmental action or policy either pe-
nalizes religious beliefs or coerces an individual to stop practicing certain religious
beliefs. Courts have found that governmental action penalized religious beliefs when
the receipt of certain benefits was contingent on an individual's acting contrary to his
religion. In Sherbert, the Court held that a state could not deny unemployment com-
pensation to Seventh-day Adventist who refused to work on Saturdays. Id.
Coercion exists when the government either outlaws certain religious practices or
requires behavior contrary to certain religious beliefs. See infra notes 21-51 and accom-
panying text discussing the requirements for establishing a prima facie case based on the
free exercise clause. See, eg., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (law
prohibiting Mormons from practicing bigamy upheld); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972) (striking down compulsory school attendance law as it applied to Amish
children).
20. A compelling state interest is an "interest of the highest order." Yoder, 406
U.S. at 215 (1972). See infra notes 21-51 and accompanying text discussing compelling
state interests and least restrictive means analysis.
21. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
22. See Marcus, supra note 6, at 1220 (Sherbert was the first major free exercise
claim resolved in favor of an individual).
23. 374 U.S. at 399. The Seventh-Day Adventists celebrate their Sabbath on Satur-
day. Id.
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ployer fired her because she refused to work on Saturdays.24 Unable to
find alternate employment which did not require Saturday work, Sher-
bert filed a claim for state unemployment compensation benefits.25 The
state declared her ineligible to receive benefits under the state act be-
cause Sherbert had refused, without good cause, to accept suitable
work offered by the employment office or an employer.
26
The Court recognized that the state act burdened Sherbert's free ex-
ercise of religion because it forced her to choose between receiving ben-
efits and practicing her religion.27 Consequently, the Court held that
the state scheme penalized the free exercise of Sherbert's religion.28
Once Sherbert had established a prima facie case, the Court considered
whether the state had a compelling state interest.29 Finding that no
compelling state interest justified the denial of the unemployment bene-
24. Id. Sherbert only worked Monday through Friday when she became a member
of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church in 1957. In 1959, however, the work week was
changed and every employee had to work on Saturdays. Id. at 399 n.l.
25. Id. at 399-400.
26. Id. at 401. The South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act, S.C. CODE
ANN. § 68-114 (Law. Co-op. 1962) provided that:
Any insured worker shall be ineligible for benefits: ...
(3) ...
(a) If the Commission finds that he has failed, without good cause, (i) either to
apply for available suitable work, when so directed by the employment office or the
Commission, (ii) to accept available suitable work when offered him by the employ-
ment office or the employer or (iii) to return to his customary self-employment (if
any) when so directed by the Commission, such ineligibility shall continue for a
period of five weeks... as determined by the Commission according to the circum-
stances in each case ....
Id.
27. 374 U.S. at 404. The Court analogized the imposition of this choice to a fine
imposed against Sherbert for her beliefs and stated that both were equally burdensome.
Id. Further, the question of whether a sincerely held religious belief was involved was
not an issue in the case; therefore, it was established that the religious belief was sincere.
Id. at 399 n.1.
28. Id. at 406. The Court stated that "Etlo condition the availability of benefits
upon this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith
effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties." Id Thus, Sherbert
had established a prima facie case of a constitutional violation. See supra note 19 for a
discussion of burdens on the exercise of free speech.
29. Id. at 406. Justice Brennan's threshold inquiry concerning a compelling state
interest required a strong showing by the state: "It is basic that no showing merely of a
rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensi-
tive constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests,
give occasion for permissible limitation.'" Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
1990]
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fits,3" the Court never reached the question of whether less restrictive
methods existed for promoting the state purpose.3 Therefore, the
Court mandated the extension of unemployment benefits to Sherbert.32
In Thomas v. Review Bd. Employee Sec. Div.,33 the Supreme Court
expressly relied on Sherbert to strike down a state's denial of unem-
ployment benefits to a Jehovah's Witness who left a job at a steel fac-
tory because of his religious beliefs.34 Thomas quit his job after he was
transferred from a non-military production department to a depart-
ment that produced turrets for military tanks. Thomas claimed that
his religious beliefs prevented him from producing war materials. 35
The Review Board found that Thomas quit without good cause, and
thus violated the Indiana unemployment compensation statute.36 The
Board therefore denied him unemployment benefits.37
Engaging in traditional free exercise analysis, the Court first deter-
30. Id. at 407. The only state interest suggested in Sherbert was a mere possibility
that the "filing of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objec-
tions to Saturday work might not only dilute the unemployment compensation fund but
also hinder the scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday work." Id.
31. The Court added, however, that even if a compelling state interest had been
shown in this case, the state would still have "to demonstrate that no alternative forms
of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing [fjirst [a]mendment rights."
374 U.S. at 407. The Court held that a state "may not constitutionally apply the [unem-
ployment] eligibility provisions so as to constrain a worker to abandon his religious
convictions.. . ." Id.
32. Id. at 410. "[Ihe consequences of... disqualification [due] to religious princi-
ples and practices may be only an indirect result [of the legislation]; it is true that no
criminal sanctions directly compel appellant to work a six-day week." Id. at 403 (cita-
tion omitted).
33. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
34. Id. at 716-20. The Thomas Court rejected the state's argument in Sherbert that
the burden is merely an indirect consequence of legitimate government action. Id. at
716-18. The Thomas court also relies on Sherbert to dismiss the state interest. Id. at
718. Finally, as in Sherbert, the Thomas court warns that it is not promoting the reli-
gion with its decision. Id at 719-20.
35. Id. at 709. The Court did not challenge the Review Board's finding that
Thomas sincerely held his beliefs. Id. at 714.
36. Id. at 712. IND. CODE ANN. § 22-4-15-1 (Burns 1978) provides:
[Ain individual who has voluntarily left his employment without good cause in
connection with the work ... shall be ineligible for waiting period or benefit rights
for the week in which the disqualifying separation occurred and until he had subse-
quently earned remuneration in employment equal to or exceeding the weekly ben-
efit amount of his claim in each of ten (10) weeks. ...
37. 450 U.S. at 709.
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mined whether the statute burdened Thomas."8 The Court concluded
that the statute in Thomas was analogous to the statute in Sherbert
because it conditioned unemployment benefits on Thomas' willingness
to violate his religious beliefs. 9 The statute forced Thomas to choose
either his religious beliefs or his work, thus creating a coercive impact
on his religion and bringing his claim within the first amendment.40
The Court next considered whether the statute was the least restrictive
means of achieving a compelling state purpose.41 Concluding that the
state failed to advance a compelling state interest, the Court mandated
payment of the benefits.4 2
The Supreme Court again utilized traditional free exercise analysis
in Wisconsin v. Yoder 43 to strike down a compulsory school attendance
statute as it applied to the Amish.' In accordance with their religion,
Amish parents refused to permit their children to attend school beyond
the eighth grade.45 Their actions violated a compulsory school attend-
38. Id. at 716-18.
39. Id. at 717-18.
40. Id. at 717. The Court stated:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed
by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated
by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify
his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the
compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless
substantial.
Id. at 717-18.
41. Id. at 718. The state advanced two interests in support of the disqualifying
provision of the Indiana statute: "(1) to avoid the widespread unemployment and the
consequent burden on the fund resulting if people were permitted to leave jobs for 'per-
sonal' reasons; and (2) to avoid a detailed probing by employers into job applicants'
religious beliefs." Id. at 718-19 (footnote omitted).
42. Id. at 719. In 1987, the Supreme Court affirmed the precedent set out in Sher-
bert and Thomas in Hobble v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S.
136 (1987). In Hobbie, the plaintiff worked for two and a half years before being bap-
tized into the Seventh-Day Adventist Church. Hobbie informed her supervisor that she
was unable to work on Saturdays due to religious beliefs. The general manager subse-
quently fired Hobbie for refusing to work her scheduled shifts. The Bobbie Court anal-
ogized the case to the situations in Sherbert and Thomas and found that the statute
penalized the plaintiff by forcing her to choose between work and religion. Thus, Hob-
bie met the prima facie standards required for first amendment protection. Id. at 141-
42. The Court also stressed that this type of infringement "must be subjected to strict
scrutiny and could be justified only by proof of a compelling interest." Id. at 141.
43. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
44. Id. at 234.
45. Id. at 207. The Amish objection to education beyond the eighth grade is central
to their religion. Id. at 210-12. One expert testified that:
1990]
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ance statute requiring parents to send their children to school until age
16.46
The Yoder Court concluded that the compulsory attendance law
burdened the Amish by coercing them to perform acts contrary to their
fundamental religious beliefs.47 The Court further held that the belief
at stake was a sincerely held religious belief.48  Consequently, the
Amish established a prima facie case under traditional free exercise
analysis, and the burden therefore shifted to the state to prove that
mandatory school attendance was a compelling state interest.49
Although the Court recognized that education of citizens was a com-
pelling state interest, 0 the Court reasoned that this interest could be
achieved through a less restrictive burden on the Amish."1
III. FREE EXERCISE ANALYSIS IN NATIVE AMERICAN SACRED
LAND CASES
Formulation of a comprehensive free exercise analysis in Native
American sacred land cases has been a constant struggle for courts. 52
Rather than following traditional free exercise analysis, lower courts
have altered the existing framework and have failed to formulate a sin-
gle test.53
[C]ompulsory high school attendance could not only result in great psychological
harm to Amish children, because of the conflicts it would produce, but would also,
in his opinion, ultimately result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish church
community as it exists in the United States today.
Id. at 212.
46. Id. at 207. WIs. STAT. § 118.15 (1969) authorizes the state to impose fines or
imprisonment on a parent who does not cause his child to attend school until the child
is 16.
47. Id. at 218. The Amish, to conform with their faith, would practice under threat
of criminal sanctions.
48. Id. at 235.
49. Id. at 221. The state argued that its interest in compulsory education out-
weighed even the Amish established practices, but the Court did not accept this "sweep-
ing" claim. Id.
50. Id. The state gave two reasons for compulsory education; to prepare citizens to
participate in the political process and to be self-sufficient members of society. Id.
51. Id. at 235. The Court reasoned that the Amish demonstrated that their alterna-
tive method of educating their children at home satisfied precisely the overall interests
that the state had in educating its citizens. Id.
52. See infra notes 54-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of district and
appellate court dispositions of sacred land cases.
53. See infra notes 89-112 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme
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In Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority,54 Cherokees sued to pre-
vent the construction and operation of the Tellico Dam on the Little
Tennessee River." The Cherokees claimed that the waters would
flood numerous sites sacred to their religion and would thus substan-
tially burden the free exercise of their religion. 6 The district court
denied plaintiff's motion for injunction and granted defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss.57 The district court assumed that the land58 was sa-
cred land and of some necessity to the Native Americans' religion, but
held that the only coercive effect on their religion would be to prevent
access to government owned land.59 Finding that the Native Ameri-
cans had no property right, and therefore no right to access, the court
concluded that the government imposed no burden on the religion in
rendering access to the land impossible.60
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court decision on a different
theory. 6' The circuit court purported to follow traditional free exercise
analysis. 62 The court, however, changed the first prong of traditional
analysis by requiring the plaintiffs to show that the government act or
Court's analysis of Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct.
1319 (1988), which may provide a uniform analysis.
54. 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
55. 480 F. Supp. at 610. The alleged purposes of the Tennessee Valley Authority in
creating the lake were: 1) energy generation, 2) creation of flatwater recreation, 3) flood
control and 4) enhancement of the local economy. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153, 157 (1978). The appellate court eluded the issue of whether these reasons
sufficiently justified infringement upon the Cherokee's religion. Instead, the court ad-
ded a centrality/indispensability criteria. 620 F.2d at 1164. See infra notes 62-74 and
accompanying text discussing the addition of the centrality/indispensability
requirement.
56. 620 F.2d at 1160. The Indians claimed that: "[P]laintiffs will suffer injury by
the infringement of their right to worship the religion of their choice in the manner of
their choosing by the destruction of sites which they hold in reverence and in denial of
access to such sites by the Defendant." Id.
57. 480 F. Supp. at 612.
58. Id. at 611.
59. Id. at 612.
60. Id.
61. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980). The circuit court noted that the plaintiff's lack
of a property interest in the property was not dispositive. Id. at 1164.
62. Id. at 1163 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). The court recognized that the first prong of this test
required a determination of "whether the governmental action does in fact create a
burden on the exercise of the plaintiff's religion." Secondly, the court must balance the
burden against a compelling government interest, if any. Id.
1990]
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policy burdened a central or indispensable belief.63 The court held that
the government did not burden a central or indispensable religious be-
lief and," therefore, refused to reach the second prong of the
analysis.65
The court in Wilson v. Block 66 utilized the Sequoyah central or in-
dispensable test in addressing a sacred lands case.67 In Wilson, mem-
bers of the Navajo and Hopi tribes attempted to enjoin the expansion
of a ski resort into their sacred land." Both tribes contended that fur-
ther development would seriously impair their ability to pray, conduct
ceremonies and gather necessary religious objects.69
The Wilson court engaged in traditional free exercise analysis and
determined that the Native Americans sincerely held their beliefs.7°
The court deviated from traditional analysis, however, by examining
whether access to the ski area was indispensable to their religious prac-
tice.71 The court scrutinized the Native American's use of the area and
required them to show, as evidence of indispensability, that their reli-
gious practice could not be performed at an alternative site.72 Accord-
63. Id. at 1164.
64. Id. The court stated that the Indians' claims demonstrated "'personal prefer-
ence' rather than convictions 'shared by an organized group.' "Id. (quoting Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216). Further, "[i]t is damage to tribal and family folklore and
traditions, more than particular religions observances, which appears to be at stake...
[and] [t]hough cultural history and tradition are vitally important to any group of peo-
ple, these are not interests protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment." Iad at 1164-65. See Frank v. Alaska, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979) (despite state
laws to the contrary, Indians could hunt moose because moose was the centerpiece of a
religious ceremony).
65. 620 F.2d at 1165.
66. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
67. Id. at 739-45. The Wilson court chose to rely on Sequoyah, rather than accept
the Sherbert and Thomas holdings, as the plaintiffs desired. The court limited the latter
cases to situations where the failure to receive government benefits penalized religious
beliefs. Id. at 741.
68. 708 F.2d at 739.
69. Id. at 740.
70. Id. at 741-45.
71. Id. at 743. The court stated: "If the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the gov-
ernment land at issue is indispensable to some religious practice, whether or not central
to their religion, they have not justified a First Amendment claim." Id. The court first
held that the ski resort expansion did not burden the Indian's religious beliefs because it
merely caused the Indians spiritual disquiet, but did not penalize them for their faith.
Id. at 741-42.
72. Id. at 744. The court stated: "We thus hold that plaintiffs seeking to restrict
government land use in the name of religious freedom must, at a minimum, demonstrate
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ing to the court, evidence of alternative sites existed, and consequently
the ski resort expansion did not burden the Native Americans religious
practices.73 Therefore, the court again failed to reach the second prong
of the analysis. 4
Badoni v. Higginson,75 like Sequoyah, represents another challenge
to governmental action involving interference by a major federal water
project onto sacred land. The completion of Glen Canyon Dam on the
Colorado River created a reservoir.76 By 1974, when suit was filed, the
reservoir waters had covered certain portions of land sacred to the
Navajos." Plaintiffs made two free exercise claims: 1) that the im-
poundment of water under the bridge drowned their gods, and 2) the
water denied them access to their religious sites.7"
The District Court for the District of Utah ruled against plaintiffs on
two grounds.79 The court, like the Sequoyah district court, first found
the plaintiffs' lack of property interest determinative.80 The court next
found that the Native Americans' interests were neither central nor
indispensable.8" Although the Tenth Circuit Court dismissed the dis-
trict court's finding of lack of property interest,82 it failed to address
that the government's proposed land use would impair a religious practice that could
not be performed at any other site." Id. (footnote omitted). This requirement increases
the elements necessary to establish a prima facie case and significantly narrows the pos-
sibility of successfully exercising a free exercise challenge when sacred lands are
involved.
73. Id. at 744-45. The Wion court noted that establishing the lack of an alterna-
tive site is not sufficient to show a burden on the free exercise of religion; rather it is a
minimum requirement without which the court need not proceed. Id. at 744-45 n.5.
74. Id. at 745.
75. 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977), aff'd, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
76. 638 F.2d at 175.
77. Id. Rainbow Bridge, a nearby spring, a prayer spot and a cave were all ad-
versely affected by the reservoir. The springs and the prayer spot were under water and
tourists desecrated the cave and bridge with noise, litter and other defacement. Id. at
177.
78. Id. at 176. The plaintiffs in Badoni sought rather modest relief, such as: closing
the bridge area to the public on rare occasions to allow for private religious ceremonies,
restricting the use of alcoholic beverages in the vicinity, and move a floating marina to
another canyon. Id. at 178.
79. 455 F. Supp. at 645-47.
80. Id. at 645.
81. Id. at 646.
82. 638 F.2d at 176 ("The government must manage its property in a manner that
does not offend the Constitution.").
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the second contention. 3 Rather, the Badoni court found a compelling
state interest that outweighed any alleged infringements, and a lack of
a less restrictive means of achieving such interest. 4
The Badoni court, similar to the Sequoyah court, purported to follow
traditional free exercise analysis.8 5 The court failed, however, to con-
sider the first prong of the analysis8 6 and instead proceeded directly to
the second prong-consideration of a compelling governmental inter-
est.8 7 The implications of this approach have a potentially devastating
effect on the outcome of sacred land cases. The decision precludes in-
quiry into the burdens on free exercise if the government can demon-
strate a significant government interest.88 The Badoni court essentially
changed the whole nature of free exercise analysis by allowing the gov-
ernment to justify its actions first, rendering the degree of infringement
analysis unnecessary. The Badoni decision did, though, clearly illus-
trate the lack of any uniform free exercise analysis in Native American
cases prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lyng.
IV. THE IMPACT OF LYNG V NORTHWEST INDIAN CEMETARY
PROTECTIVE Ass'N 89 ON FREE EXERCISE ANALYSIS
A. Facts
The Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa tribes consider the northeastern cor-
ner of the Blue Creek Unit in Six Rivers National Forest, California,
sacred land.' Ceremonial use of the area by the tribes dates back to
83. Id. at 177 n.4. The court held the government interest in the water level was so
compelling that it need not address whether the action infringed plaintiffs' rights. Id.
84. Id. at 177. Contrary to the dam in Sequoyah, the Glen Canyon Dam had been
constructed and was in operation at the time of plaintiffs' complaint. Further, the court
considered the dam a genuinely important edifice, an essential element in the manage-
ment of the Colorado River and a key to water access in the vast areas of Colorado,
New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming. Id. See Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 485
F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied., 414 U.S. 1171 (1974) (found the Glen Canyon
Dam to be of crucial importance).
85. 638 F.2d at 176-77.
86. The first prong in traditional analysis considers whether a government action
burdens a sincerely held religious belief. See supra note 19 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the first prong of traditional analysis.
87. 638 F.2d at 177. The court found that the magnitude of the government's inter-
est justified the alleged infringements. Id.
88. Id. Referring to alleged infringements on free exercise, the court said it need
not address the issue because it had found the government's interest compelling.
89. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
90. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 591
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RELIGIOUS PROTECTION
the early nineteenth century and is critical to certain religious practices
of the tribes.91
In 1974 and 1975, the Forest Service issued drafts of environmental
impact statements proposing various land use management plans and
the completion of road construction in the Blue Creek Unit.92 In re-
sponse to comments on the 1975 draft statement, the Forest Service
commissioned a study of the cultural and religious sites in the area.93
Declaring the area a significant and indispensable part of the Native
American religion, the report recommended that the Forest Service
abandon its plans for road development. 94 The Forest Service, how-
ever, chose to proceed with construction and issued a final environmen-
tal impact statement indicating its intent to do so.95
After exhausting all administrative remedies, four Native Ameri-
cans, the State of California and various individuals and nature organi-
zations filed suit to enjoin the logging and road construction
activities.9 6
B. District and Appellate Court Disposition
Engaging in traditional free exercise analysis, both the district and
appellate courts found that the government interfered with the Native
Americans' first amendment free exercise rights.97 The government
(N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 764 F.2d 581 (1985) (Northwest 1),
aff'd in relevant part, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986) (Northwest I), rev'd sub nom. Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
A total of 31,000 of the 67,500 total acres encompassed by the Blue Creek Unit are
roadless areas. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581,
583 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (Northwest 1).
91. Northwest, 565 F. Supp. at 591-92. Individuals utilize the area for prayer seats
and seek religious guidance in the area. Key participants in tribal ceremonies utilize the
area to purify themselves, and medicine women travel to the area to obtain power and
to gather medicine. Id.
92. Northwest I, 764 F.2d at 584.
93. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442.
94. Id. at 442.
95. Id. at 443. Although nine different routes were considered, they were ultimately
rejected because they would have required the acquisition of private land, had soil sta-
bility problems and would have nonetheless affected the sacred lands. Id.
96. Id. at 443.
97. Northwest, 505 F. Supp. at 592-93; Northwest I, 764 F.2d at 585-86. The appel-
late court rejected the argument that the free exercise clause is not violated unless it
penalizes religious beliefs or practices. Indirect burdens could suffice. Northwest I, 764
F.2d at 586.
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did not challenge the sincerity of the Native Americans' beliefs in
either proceeding. 9 Further, because the area constituted the center of
the Native Americans' spiritual world and no alternative site was ade-
quate, the appellate court affirmed the district court's finding of "cen-
trality-indispensability."99
Holding that the Native Americans met the first part of free exercise
analysis, the lower courts then turned to the issue of whether the gov-
ernment's interests in logging and road construction were compelling
under the second prong of the test."c° Concluding that the interests
claimed by the Forest Service were not sufficient to override the Native
Americans' interests, 0 1 both courts issued permanent injunctions
preventing road construction and timber harvesting in the Blue Creek
Unit area.10 2
C. Supreme Court Disposition
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,103 the
Supreme Court reversed the lower court decisions and remanded to
decide the statutory issues in the case."° The Court then addressed
Lyng's constitutional issues, and upheld the government's right to
build a road and harvest timber on land considered sacred by the Na-
tive Americans.1"5 In reaching the latter holding, the Court relied on a
1986,Supreme Court case, Bowen v. Roy.1" The Bowen Court con-
98. Northwest, 565 F. Supp. at 594; Northwest , 764 F.2d at 586.
99. Northwest , 764 F.2d at 585-86. The Forest Service's own study suggested that
the development could potentially destroy the core of the Indian religious beliefs and
practices. See D. THEODORATUS, CULTURAL RESOURCES OF THE CHIMNEY ROCK
SECTION, GASQUET-ORLEANS ROAD, SIx RIVERS NATIONAL FOREST 420 (1979).
100. Northwest, 565 F. Supp. at 595-96; Northwest 1, 764 F.2d at 586-87.
101. Northwest, 565 F. Supp. at 595-96; Northwest 1, 764 F.2d at 587.
102. Northwest, 565 F. Supp. at 606; Northwest 1, 764 F.2d at 589. The Ninth Cir-
cuit later affirmed the circuit court's constitutional ruling, finding that the construction
of the road would have significant adverse effects on Native American religious prac-
tices. Northwest II, 795 F.2d at 693. The government failed to demonstrate a compel-
ling interest in the completion of the road, and consequently could have abandoned
completion of the road and thus avoided burdening the tribes. Northwest I1, 795 F.2d at
695.
103. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
104. Id. at 445-47. The Court held that lower courts should avoid constitutional
questions if possible, and that the Northwest courts failed to ascertain whether statutory
claims gave the Native Americans sufficient relief. Id.
105. Id. at 458.
106. 476 U.S. 693 (1986). In Bowen, Indians refused to apply for a Social Security
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cluded that governments must be able to conduct their activities with-
out conforming to the religious beliefs of particular citizens." 7 The
Lyng Court continued by following traditional free exercise analysis l0
and, like Bowen, confirmed the addition of a coercion or penalty re-
quirement in free exercise analysis."°
Consequently, to establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must prove
that the government action either coerces him to act contrary to his
beliefs or penalizes the free exercise of his religion." 0 The Court nar-
number because they believed that Social Security and other programs hindered the
achievement of spiritual purity. Pennsylvania's welfare programs, however, required a
Social Security number as a prerequisite to receive benefits. The plaintiffs sued to re-
cover benefits, claiming the state violated their first amendment rights. Id. at 695-96.
The Supreme Court held that not all burdens on religion were unconstitutional. Id.
at 702. The Bowen statutes did not compel the Indians to change their religion or pun-
ish them for practicing it. Id. at 703. The Court stated that the statute intruded much
less on religious beliefs than on affirmative compulsion or prohibition statute. The
Pennsylvania statute merely applies uniformly to deny government benefits. Id. at 704.
The Court distinguished Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), which involved a
compulsory attendance law with criminal sanctions. Id. at 705 n.15.
The Court reviewed Bowen with a tougher standard than Yoder because Bowen in-
volves an indirect burden rather than a compelling burden or punishment. Id. at 707.
The Court also distinguished Sherbert and Thomas. Id. at 708.
107. Id. at 699-700. The appellate court in Northwest II distinguished Bowen. 795
F.2d at 693. The Ninth Circuit noted that the government action in Northwest virtually
destroyed the Indian's ability to practice their religion. In Bowen, the Supreme Court
stated that the government's use of a Social Security number did not impair the plain-
tiff's ability to practice his religion. Id. (citing Bowen, 476 U.S. at 700-01).
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the Bowen holding that only statutes which penalize
religious beliefs violate the first amendment. Government action which indirectly bur-
dens first amendment rights may also be invalid. 795 F.2d at 693 (citing Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1972)).
The Supreme Court in Lyng explained that the attempts to distinguish Bowen are
unavailing. 485 U.S. at 449. The Court refused to analyze the degree of the burden
upon an individual's beliefs. Id at 450.
108. 485 U.S. at 450.
109. 485 U.S. at 450-51. The Lyng court recognized that "indirect coercion or pen-
alties on the free exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions, are subject to scru-
tiny under the First Amendment." Id. at 450. The majority stated, however, that
"incidental effects of government programs, which may make it more difficult to prac-
tice certain religions but which [do not] coerce individuals into acting contrary to their
religious beliefs, [do not] require [the] government to bring forward a compelling justifi-
cation for its otherwise lawful actions." Id. at 450-51.
110. Id. at 450-51. The Lyng court emphasized that the Constitution condemns
laws which prohibit the free exercise of religion, not laws which merely frustrate or
impede religious practices or beliefs. Id. at 451. The Court recognized that the line
between unconstitutional prohibitions and unlawful government conduct is not definite.
Id. The Court appeared reluctant, however, to inquire into the effects of government
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rowly construed the government's action in Lyng as neither coercing
the Native Americans to act in a fashion contrary to their beliefs nor
penalizing them.1" By narrowly construing the penalty/coercion re-
quirement, the Court effectively precluded future suits against the gov-
ernment by Native Americans attempting to enjoin destruction or
alteration of their sacred lands.
V. CONCLUSION
In Lyng, the Supreme Court held that a federal land use decision
which promised to destroy an entire religion did not constitute a pen-
alty or coercion. 12 Through this narrow construction of the pen-
alty/coercion requirement, the Court has divested the respondents and
other Native Americans of first amendment protection against a seri-
ous threat to their religious practices and entire way of life. The Court
abandoned nearly all references to traditional free exercise analysis,
neglecting to balance the burden on the Native American's religion
with the government interest. Although Lyng finally established an an-
alytical framework for examining sacred land free exercise claims, its
utility will be fruitless if the Court continues to read the coer-
cion/penalty requirement so narrowly.
Camala Collins*
action on various religions and insisted that government could not exist if it had to
reconcile the competing demands of various religions beliefs. Id. at 451-52.
111. Id. at 449. The Court recognized that the logging and road-building projects
at issue could have a devastating effect on traditional Indian religious practices that are
"intimately and inextricably bound up with the unique features of the Chimney Rock
area." Id. at 451. In spite of this recognition, however, the Court avoided utilizing a
compelling governmental interest balancing test by holding that the government was
not coercing or penalizing the Indians' religious practices and beliefs.
112. See supra notes 104-111 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Lyng
holding.
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